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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)

Reporting period from 29 June to 13 November 2013

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) since my previous report of 26 June 2013 ([S/2013/381](#)).

2. I welcome the presidential statement adopted by the Security Council on 10 July ([S/PRST/2013/9](#)).

3. Throughout a period punctuated by episodes of markedly heightened tension related to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, the situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained relatively calm albeit, as in the rest of Lebanon, tense. The parties continued their close cooperation with UNIFIL and sought to intensify their use of the mission's liaison and coordination arrangements. There were two serious incidents of note: a ground incursion on 7 August by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line and ensuing military action by Hizbullah; and a rocket attack from Lebanon against Israel on 22 August, followed by a retaliatory strike by the Israel Defense Forces the following day.

4. UNIFIL took a number of measures aimed at preventing and mitigating any potential incident or rise in tensions across the Blue Line that could have been prompted by regional developments. UNIFIL held a tripartite meeting on 28 August, which was followed by separate letters from the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander to both parties, in which he impressed upon them the need to remain focused on implementing all the provisions of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), especially with regard to preserving the cessation of hostilities. Lebanon and Israel continued to affirm their commitment to resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), but there was no progress towards the implementation of their respective outstanding obligations under the resolution.

5. During the reporting period, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to serve as the background for violence in Lebanon, and there were three major terrorist attacks. There were two bombings on 9 July and 15 August in the southern suburbs of Beirut, which caused a number of fatalities, casualties and material



damage. On 23 August, car bombs detonated simultaneously adjacent to two mosques in Tripoli, causing further fatalities and hundreds of casualties.

6. Cross-border shelling and shooting from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon continued, injuring one Lebanese citizen and causing material damage. There was at least one air strike by a Syrian government helicopter. The Lebanese Armed Forces reported continued smuggling of weapons across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The nine remaining pilgrims abducted in the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 May 2012 were released on 19 October 2013, as were two Turkish Airlines pilots kidnapped in Beirut on 9 August 2013 in an apparently related incident.

7. The ongoing crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic has led to a sustained influx of refugees seeking shelter in Lebanon, with more than 800,000 refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic registered or awaiting registration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and partners — an increase of approximately 400,000 people since my previous report.

8. The Prime Minister-designate, Tammam Salam, continued consultations on the formation of a new Government. Following the extension of its mandate, the Lebanese Parliament has held no substantive meetings. The Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, and members of his Government remain in office in a caretaker capacity.

9. On 25 September, I chaired the inaugural meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon in New York, on the margins of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, in the presence of the President of Lebanon, Michel Sleiman. The group undertook to work together to mobilize support for the sovereignty and State institutions of Lebanon and to highlight and promote efforts to assist Lebanon where it was most affected by the Syrian crisis, including in respect of strengthening the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces, assistance to refugees and vulnerable communities affected by the crisis, and structural and financial support to the Government.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

10. In the early hours of 7 August, UNIFIL observed and heard two explosions and gunfire, as well as flashes apparently from a trip flare, near United Nations position 1-31 in the general area of Labouneh, in southern Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently confirmed that its soldiers had been involved in an operational activity north of the Blue Line related to its country's concern about the alleged reactivation of Hizbullah infrastructure and the presence of unauthorized armed personnel and weapons in the area. The Israel Defense Forces also informed UNIFIL that four of its soldiers had been slightly injured after they had crossed the Line and that they had been engaged by another group, believed to be Hizbullah. The latter stated publicly that it had taken action against the Israel Defense Forces soldiers.

11. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces provided UNIFIL with sets of coordinates where, they alleged, the explosions had taken place. UNIFIL identified the site of the incident at a location 628 m north of the Blue Line.

Evidence found at the incident site confirmed explosions and small arms fire. Components of a possible improvised explosive device were found during the investigations. Traces of blood were found on a track leading south of the incident site, but none at the site itself. UNIFIL completed its investigation into the incident and shared its findings with the parties.

12. The UNIFIL investigation concluded that the presence of Israel Defense Forces soldiers inside Lebanese territory in violation of the Blue Line constituted a serious breach of the cessation of hostilities and the terms of resolution 1701 (2006), including the provision that there should be no armed personnel, assets or weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River. The presence of Hizbullah armed personnel and weapons, as well as munitions that caused the explosions in the area, also constituted a violation of the resolution.

13. On 22 August, four rockets were launched towards Israel from an orchard near Burj al-Qibli, south-east of Tyre in the UNIFIL area of operations, approximately 19 km north of the Blue Line. At least three rockets hit Israeli territory, including a residential area at Gesher Haziv, some 7 km south of the Blue Line, and Beth El Hotel, located in a residential area at Shave Zion, some 14.5 km south of the Blue Line. No casualties from the rockets that had caused infrastructural damage were reported. A third rocket reportedly was intercepted by the “Iron Dome” defence system of Israel. In addition, the Israel Defense Forces reported that a fourth rocket had fallen into the Mediterranean Sea, while the Lebanese Armed Forces believed that one of the rockets had landed in the Qateha Valley, within Lebanese territory. On 23 August, Israel conducted a retaliatory air strike at an area near Na’meh between Beirut and Saida, outside the UNIFIL area of operations.

14. UNIFIL has since completed its investigations into the incidents and shared its findings with the parties. Within hours of the incident, a UNIFIL investigation team, accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces, inspected the site of the rocket launch, and a separate UNIFIL investigation team visited the three rocket impact sites in Israel accompanied by the Israel Defense Forces. A UNIFIL helicopter reconnaissance did not find any additional launching or impact sites within the area of operations. At the launch site, UNIFIL found four launching platforms, each with two or more wooden planks partially burned or damaged, as well as blast residue. An electric circuit board was also found.

15. At the impact sites in Israel, remnants of the rockets had been removed by the Israeli authorities prior to the visit of the UNIFIL investigation team. On 27 August, UNIFIL investigators inspected the purported remnants of the rockets at a laboratory in Israel and found them to be 122-mm calibre rockets. The “Brigades of Abdullah Azzam, Ziad Jarrah Battalions” claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks, but UNIFIL is not in a position to determine the veracity of this claim. The Lebanese Armed Forces subsequently arrested two individuals suspected of involvement.

16. The UNIFIL investigation concluded that the firing of rockets from Lebanese territory across the Blue Line constituted a serious breach of the cessation of hostilities and of resolution 1701 (2006). The presence of unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River was itself a violation of the resolution.

17. On two occasions, Lebanese shepherds were apprehended by the Israel Defense Forces after allegedly crossing south of the Blue Line. On 2 July, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it had apprehended two Lebanese shepherds south of the Blue Line in the area of Shab'a Farms. One of the two shepherds was apprehended again by the Israel Defense Forces on 8 July. UNIFIL did not observe either incident, which occurred out of sight of its positions. The shepherds were handed over to UNIFIL the following day, and UNIFIL, in close coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross, in turn handed them over to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL conducted an investigation into the incidents and was unable to determine which party had violated the Blue Line. The Blue Line in this area is not visibly marked.

18. Other ground violations involved the brief crossing of the Blue Line by some 5-50 m in most cases, and mainly in the areas of Shab'a, Meiss ej-Jebel, Rumaysh, Aytarun and Blida. Where UNIFIL was present at the scene, its soldiers warned the shepherds and farmers not to cross the Blue Line. Other violations involved fishermen and, on one occasion, young swimmers crossing the Blue Line in the Wazzani River close to the resorts in the area. UNIFIL protested against the violations to the Lebanese Armed Forces and recalled that it was the primary responsibility of the Lebanese authorities to ensure full respect for the Blue Line in its entirety.

19. In addition to the Labouneh incident of 7 August, there were three other incidents of violation of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces. On 12 July, five Israel Defense Forces soldiers crossed the Blue Line by 1-2 m in the area around Sheikh Abbad Tomb while a group of Israeli pilgrims were visiting the tomb on the Israeli side. On 21 August, during maintenance work on the technical fence near Aytarun, five Israel Defense Forces personnel briefly violated the Blue Line. On 1 October, a UNIFIL patrol observed four Israel Defense Forces soldiers north of the Blue Line in the area of Shab'a Farms calling out to two Lebanese shepherds who were inside Lebanese territory. A UNIFIL investigation concluded that the Israel Defense Forces had violated the Blue Line by 226 m. UNIFIL protested against all these violations to the Israel Defense Forces.

20. Overflights of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces continued almost daily by unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets, in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and Lebanese sovereignty. The air activity was particularly intense during the period of heightened regional tensions at the end of August and early in September. UNIFIL protested against all the air violations to the Israel Defense Forces, calling upon the authorities to cease them immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested against the violations, while the Government of Israel continued to claim that the overflights were necessary security measures.

21. The Israel Defense Forces continued their occupation of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). UNIFIL is still waiting for a response from Israel regarding security arrangements to facilitate the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area, proposed to both parties in 2011 and since approved by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Pending a response from the Government of Israel, UNIFIL continued its consultations with both parties, with a view to preventing any incident in the area.

22. Aside from the serious incidents described above, UNIFIL observed several incidents of tension across the Blue Line, including incidents involving the aiming of weapons, stone throwing and unfriendly behaviour. On 11 August, Lebanese civilians threw stones at an Israel Defense Forces patrol passing south of the Blue Line before the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and removed the civilians from the area.

23. On 21 August, in the vicinity of the Wazzani resort, a stand-off occurred when Israel Defense Forces personnel and armoured vehicles deployed between the technical fence and the Blue Line, while the Lebanese Armed Forces in turn deployed reinforcements on their side of the river. UNIFIL has since taken additional measures to enhance its observation and to deter potential incidents in the area. On 3 September, near El Adeisse, in an incident which merited concern, UNIFIL observed Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers aiming their weapons at an Israel Defense Forces soldier. The Israel Defense Forces soldiers in turn aimed their weapons at the Lebanese Armed Forces, before the two sides disengaged.

24. The Lebanese Armed Forces strength in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River remained at the level of approximately two brigades organized along the general operational boundaries of the two sectors of UNIFIL. The Lebanese Armed Forces reiterated to UNIFIL their intention to return some of their units to the area as soon as their operational capabilities and the country's security situation allowed.

25. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued their daily coordinated operational activities, co-locating checkpoints, including seven along the Litani River, and coordinating patrolling and joint training activities. During the period under review, UNIFIL conducted on average approximately 350 daily operational activities, including operations conducted together with the Lebanese Armed Forces, which remained at the same level as that during the previous reporting period. Joint counter-rocket launching operations were increased in the aftermath of the rocket attack against Israel on 22 August and through the ensuing period of heightened regional tensions until early in September.

26. UNIFIL generally enjoyed full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations. On several occasions, UNIFIL encountered situations in which civilians displayed aggressive behaviour, impeded the freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and caused damage to UNIFIL property. On 9 July, in the general area of Rshaf, a UNIFIL minivan was blocked by some 15 civilians with two cars. The civilians accused the soldiers of taking photographs and snatched a GPS device, a road map and personal items from UNIFIL personnel. The UNIFIL vehicle left the area upon the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

27. On 20 July, in the vicinity of Blida, five civilians with two vehicles prevented the movement of a UNIFIL patrol, alleging that UNIFIL personnel were taking photographs. The civilians allowed the patrol to proceed only after being assured by the Lebanese Armed Forces that the UNIFIL personnel did not carry a camera. On 13 and 27 July, UNIFIL patrols were subject to stone throwing in the general area of Bint Jubayl by groups of local youths.

28. Late at night on 28 August, a UNIFIL patrol in the general area of Aytarun encountered three vehicles, two scooters and approximately 15 individuals manning a road block. Several of the vehicles undertook aggressive pursuit of the patrol,

while at one point a UNIFIL vehicle had to ram a civilian vehicle that had blocked the road between two UNIFIL vehicles. On 1 September, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped on a road near Blida by six individuals, later joined by others, who deflated the two rear tires of the UNIFIL vehicle and threw stones at the vehicle, breaking its rear window and tail light. A Lebanese Armed Forces officer, accompanied by the Mayor of Blida, arrived at the location and dispersed the crowd.

29. Late at night on 2 September, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl by civilians complaining of the patrol's presence without the Lebanese Armed Forces. As a crowd gathered and began to damage UNIFIL vehicles, the patrol had to force its way out by driving over an unmanned motorcycle. On 6 September in Bint Jubayl, some 20 individuals blocked the road in front of a UNIFIL patrol with large stones and by connecting a vehicle winch to a concrete pole, accusing the patrol of taking photographs. Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and escorted the patrol out of the area. UNIFIL protested against all these incidents to the Lebanese Armed Forces, requesting that they be investigated.

30. Notwithstanding these incidents, the attitude of the local population towards UNIFIL remained largely positive. UNIFIL provided regular community services, including medical, dental, veterinary and educational assistance, and continued the implementation of quick-impact projects across the area of operations. UNIFIL coordinated its activities with a wide range of civilian actors.

31. In line with the recommendations from the strategic review aimed at increasing the involvement of the Government of Lebanon in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL continued to liaise closely with various ministries. In consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, UNIFIL developed a guidance manual on sound veterinary practices for local distribution. In collaboration with the Ministry of Education, it continued to provide vocational training for public technical schools. The Minister of Information visited UNIFIL twice, following which further cooperation has been established with the State news agencies.

32. UNIFIL continued to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL. This remains a long-term objective. The incidents over the reporting period, detailed above, demonstrated that weapons and hostile armed elements ready to use them were present within the area of operations. Furthermore, on four occasions armed soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces crossed the Blue Line into the area of operations. The mission was not able to determine whether the rockets and explosives materials used in the incidents described above were already present in its area of operations or whether they were brought in from outside. UNIFIL did not discover any new arms caches, military materiel or infrastructure during the reporting period. The Force did not find evidence that previously discovered sites had been reactivated.

33. The Government of Israel continued to allege that Hizbullah had been building up its military presence inside populated areas in southern Lebanon and that unauthorized weapons were being transferred into Lebanon, including into the UNIFIL area of operations. If specific information is received regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons in its area of operations, UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, remains determined to act using all means available within its mandate and to the full extent provided for in its rules of

engagement. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL does not proactively search for weapons in the south. As described in my previous reports, UNIFIL cannot enter private property unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from that specific location. To date, UNIFIL has neither been provided with nor found evidence of the unauthorized transfer of arms into its area of operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces Command continued to state that it would act immediately to put a stop to any illegal activity in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006) and relevant government decisions. Subsequent to the incident of 7 August in Labouneh, the Israel Defense Forces provided UNIFIL with the coordinates of alleged Hizbullah military sites in the Labouneh area. UNIFIL shared the information with the Lebanese Armed Forces and is following up in accordance with established procedures.

34. In August, the Lebanese Armed Forces discovered seven rockets and nine 122-mm artillery shells in unserviceable condition in the area of Ra's al-Ayn to the south of Tyre. In addition, on 28 September, a hand grenade was found inside the engine of a car in Tyre. Lebanese security forces arrived at the scene and initiated an investigation. During the reporting period, UNIFIL observed an increase in the number of individuals carrying hunting weapons in its area of operations. In each case, UNIFIL patrols acted to stop the hunting activity. On several occasions, the Lebanese Armed Forces apprehended the hunters and confiscated their hunting weapons. UNIFIL continued to maintain a high number of patrols and observation posts in known hunting areas.

35. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out maritime interdiction operations in the area of maritime operations and training of Lebanese navy personnel. Since my previous report, as at 30 October, the Maritime Task Force had hailed 2,307 ships and the Lebanese navy and customs officials had inspected 532 vessels in order to verify that there were no unauthorized arms or related materiel on board. The Maritime Task Force had conducted 194 training activities with the Lebanese navy at sea and onshore.

36. Along the line of buoys, UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces patrol boats dropping five explosive depth charges and firing one flare, reportedly in order to ward off Lebanese fishing boats in the vicinity. An Israel Defense Forces patrol boat conducted maintenance work on several buoys. UNIFIL has no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which the Government of Israel installed unilaterally and which the Government of Lebanon does not recognize.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

37. UNIFIL continued to carry out its liaison and coordination with both parties, as set out in my previous reports. Daily interaction and liaison activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued at its established high and effective level. UNIFIL has also maintained effective liaison and coordination with the Israel Defense Forces. There has been no progress in establishing a UNIFIL office in Tel Aviv.

38. The parties repeatedly demonstrated their readiness to engage in UNIFIL efforts to address points of contention and decrease tensions. This was particularly significant during the period of heightened regional tension and after the serious violations of resolution 1701 (2006) outlined above. Both parties cooperated closely

with UNIFIL during this period, including by emphasizing their commitment to the cessation of hostilities.

39. The tripartite forum remained the key mechanism for UNIFIL and the parties to address security and military operational issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), including ensuring full respect for the Blue Line in its entirety. It provides strategic-level liaison and coordination and offers a platform through which UNIFIL can facilitate practical arrangements and localized understandings on the ground between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces that would remove possible points of friction, defuse tension in potential flashpoints, stabilize the situation and build confidence.

40. As a case in point, at the request of UNIFIL, the Israel Defense Forces agreed to delay its planned works between the technical fence and the Blue Line at two sensitive locations in Abasiya and Aytarun until after a scheduled tripartite meeting. After discussions at the tripartite meeting on 9 October, the Israel Defense Forces completed the works at Abasiya without incident. In Aytarun, the Lebanese Armed Forces carried out the painting of a previously constructed Blue Line marker base where a Lebanese farm straddles the Blue Line. UNIFIL continues to engage the parties on finding localized arrangements to address related humanitarian and security concerns. At the tripartite meeting, the parties demonstrated renewed interest in addressing problematic or contentious points along the Blue Line. UNIFIL is seeking to build on this momentum through concrete measures on the ground that would further build confidence among the parties and help bolster the process.

41. Progress in the visible marking of the Blue Line remained steady. As at 23 October, the parties had agreed to mark 311 of 522 Blue Line points to be marked. UNIFIL demining teams have cleared access to 283 points to date, 221 of which have been measured. Some 199 Blue Line markers have been constructed and 180 verified by both parties.

42. UNIFIL efforts to assist with the development of the capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces through the strategic dialogue continued. Pursuant to the recommendations from the strategic review, UNIFIL completed an internal study of increased UNIFIL involvement in Lebanese Armed Forces capacity-building. In consultation with my Special Coordinator, a coordination mechanism for donations made in the framework of the strategic dialogue process was designed by UNIFIL with the Lebanese Armed Forces. At a meeting on 29 July with representatives of countries contributing troops to UNIFIL and permanent members of the Security Council, co-chaired by my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces provided a briefing on their five-year capabilities development plan, of which the strategic dialogue between the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL remains an integral part, with a view to garnering international support. Participants at the inaugural meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon, held on 25 September at United Nations Headquarters, encouraged my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL to work with the Lebanese Armed Forces to activate coordination mechanisms in support of the five-year capabilities development plan and the strategic dialogue.

C. Disarming armed groups

43. The Security Council, in its resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), called for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1680 \(2006\)](#), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that there would be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government.

44. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the Lebanese State continued to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains a substantial military capacity separate from that of the Lebanese State, which, it claims, serves as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel. During the reporting period, President Sleiman again publicly restated the position on the control and use of Hizbullah's arms contained in the national defence strategy paper that he had presented as a basis for discussion in the National Dialogue in September 2012. No meetings of the National Dialogue were held during the reporting period, although President Sleiman and other Lebanese political leaders had called for one. In Beirut, following the bombing on 15 August in the Shia neighbourhood of Rouweiss, Hizbullah established and manned checkpoints at routes into the Shia suburbs. Hizbullah handed over control of the checkpoints to Lebanese security and the Lebanese Armed Forces on 23 September.

45. During the reporting period, bombings, further violence in Tripoli, clashes between the Lebanese Armed Forces and criminal elements and other incidents involving arms or explosives all reflected the serious threat to stability posed by the proliferation of arms outside the control of the State. Three bombs detonated to target vehicles on highways exploded on 29 June and on 7 and 16 July, injuring five people. On 9 July, a car bomb exploded in Bir el-Abed in the southern suburbs of Beirut, injuring 53 people and causing material damage. From 29 June to 2 July, shooting between the predominantly Sunni neighbourhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the neighbouring Alawite area of Jabel Mohsen in Tripoli caused three fatalities and 10 injuries. On 1 August, two rockets landed near the presidential palace in Baabda without causing injury. The car bomb detonated in Beirut, in the southern suburb of Rouweiss, on 15 August killed at least 24 people and injured more than 300. On 23 August, two car bombs exploded simultaneously in Tripoli, killing at least 40 people and injuring more than 500. Following the explosions, armed elements set up checkpoints for a day in the streets of Tripoli in an attempt to impose "self-security" but withdrew in the face of broad opposition from the city's leadership, and the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to maintain security. On 14 October, the State Commissioner to the Military Court announced the indictment of seven suspects alleged to have been involved in the Tripoli bombings, three of whom had been arrested. On 21 October, violence started again between the Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabel Mohsen areas in Tripoli, causing at least 16 more fatalities and injuring more than 50 people. Other shootings and explosions during the reporting period caused at least four fatalities and nine further injuries.

46. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to deploy to apprehend fugitives and prevent violence. On 31 July and on 3 and 8 August, there were clashes between the Lebanese Armed Forces and fugitive elements, which caused four fatalities, including one soldier, and eight injuries. On 18 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces found a vehicle carrying 250 kg of explosives and other materiel in the Shouf

district. On 5 October, security forces dismantled a bomb set to explode in the northern Akkar district. Continuity in the leadership of the Lebanese Armed Forces was assured by the extension of the terms of the Army Commander, General Jean Kahwaji, and his Chief of Staff on 2 August for a period of two years.

47. There was no progress on the dismantling of military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. In 2006, it was decided in the National Dialogue that these bases should be dismantled. The existence of these bases continues to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to effectively monitor and control parts of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

48. On 3 July, during a visit to Lebanon, the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, stressed the need for Palestinian disassociation from the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and from any internal conflict in Lebanon. On 27 October, a Fatah member of the joint security force was killed in Ein el-Helweh camp.

D. Arms embargo and border control

49. In resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), the Security Council decided that all States should prevent the sale or the supply of arms and related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon by their nationals, or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft. The Council also called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points so as to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms and related materiel.

50. Representatives of the Government of Israel have consistently alleged that there are significant, ongoing arms transfers to Hizbullah across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The United Nations takes these allegations seriously but is not in a position to verify them independently. Representatives of the Government of Israel have expressed concern at the prospect of the transfer of chemical or advanced weapons systems to Hizbullah, including surface-to-surface, surface-to-sea and surface-to-air missiles, which, they state, constitute a “red line” for Israel. Hizbullah has denied allegations that chemical weapons may have been transferred to it and said that it has no intention of acquiring them.

51. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to deploy in border areas to counter the smuggling of weapons and prevent the movement of armed elements between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. On 21 August, there were reports that the Lebanese security forces stopped a truck carrying 107-mm rockets into Lebanon. On 25 September, a Syrian national was killed when the Lebanese Armed Forces shot at a vehicle that refused to stop at a checkpoint near Aarsal, in the northern Beqaa valley. On 28 September, three Lebanese soldiers were injured when a shell from the Syrian Arab Republic landed near their post in the northern Akkar region. On 29 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced the confiscation of a truck carrying ammunition near Aarsal. Cross-border fire during the reporting period continued, injuring one Lebanese citizen on 19 July in the Akkar region. There was one air strike on 7 October by a Syrian army helicopter that fired at least four missiles near Aarsal. President Sleiman has condemned attacks from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon.

52. On 17 August, Hizbullah again publicly acknowledged its continued involvement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic. President Sleiman has continued to call for all parties to adhere to the policy of disassociation agreed in the Baabda Declaration during the National Dialogue session of June 2012.

53. The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon has continued to grow. As at 29 October, 805,741 Syrians had approached UNHCR, almost 80 per cent of whom were women and children. This includes 34,340 registered refugees in the UNIFIL area of operations. The fifth regional response plan, which called for more than \$1.6 billion in funding to address refugee needs in Lebanon until the end of the year, is 44 per cent funded. Many refugees live in substandard accommodation and lack access to basic services, including clean water and sanitation. Humanitarian partners have started implementing a winterization programme to mitigate the additional challenge posed by colder temperatures. UNHCR, the World Food Programme and partners have begun targeting their assistance to the most needy and vulnerable on the basis of a recent vulnerability assessment.

54. Tensions continued to be observed in Palestinian refugee camps stemming from overcrowding, competition for employment, rising prices and other factors resulting in part from the influx of Palestine refugees displaced from the Syrian Arab Republic. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in Lebanon, during the month of September the total number of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic present in Lebanon was estimated to be 48,000. In view of the increased entry restrictions imposed by the Lebanese authorities at the border, the projected number of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic by the end of the year has now been revised downward to approximately 60,000.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

55. Eight manual mine clearance teams, three explosives ordnance disposal teams and one mechanical clearance team from UNIFIL are currently validated by the United Nations Mine Action Support Team, a project of the United Nations Mine Action Service implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services in southern Lebanon and deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations. From 1 July to 30 October, UNIFIL cleared more than 7,675 m² of hazardous land to provide access to Blue Line points. In addition, 156 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed during the reporting period. Furthermore, the United Nations Mine Action Support Team conducted 26 validation events, 139 quality assurance visits of operational sites and 92 visits, meetings and demonstrations.

56. The Lebanese Mine Action Centre reported that, during the period from 1 July to 22 October, it had cleared 490,491 m² of hazardous land, including minefields and battle areas, and destroyed 849 cluster munition items and 125 unexploded ordnance.

F. Delineation of borders

57. There was no progress towards the delineation or demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border during the reporting period, including in areas where it is uncertain or disputed, as called for in Security Council resolutions [1680 \(2006\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). Extending the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the

entire Lebanese territory and enabling the Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure borders to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel requires the delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic as soon as practicable.

58. Neither was there any progress on the issue of the Shab'a Farms. To date, there has been no reaction to the provisional definition of that area contained in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\) \(S/2007/641\)](#) from either Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

59. UNIFIL continued to cooperate closely with the Lebanese authorities to ensure the safety and security of all Force personnel, in addition to applying its own risk mitigation measures, continuously reviewing its security plan and carrying out safety awareness training for its personnel.

60. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in the Lebanese Military Courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers, the latest of which took place in 2011. In a case dating back to 2010 and involving suspects forming a group with terroristic intent and illegal possession of military weapons, on 18 September the Permanent Court issued a verdict in absentia, sentencing three individuals with forced labour for life and stripping them of their civil rights. In the case of a serious attack perpetrated in 2008, the Permanent Court of first instance scheduled a hearing on 11 November 2013. Investigation is ongoing in four other cases of serious attacks perpetrated in 2007 and 2011. The Appeal Court scheduled a hearing on 27 March 2014 concerning a sentence handed down in October 2012 in the case of an attempted attack against UNIFIL in 2008.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

61. As at 23 October, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 11,114, including 335 women. The civilian component consisted of 313 international and 637 national staff, including 94 and 162 women, respectively. A total of 53 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers, including one woman, are also part of UNIFIL.

62. Turkey withdrew its engineering construction company from UNIFIL at the end of August. In July, Nepal withdrew one infantry company, consisting of approximately 130 troops, from its UNIFIL contingent in order to deploy it to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. Nepal provided a replacement company to UNIFIL during the rotation of its troops early in September. One Serbian company was deployed early in November to Sector East as part of the Spanish battalion.

63. In line with the recommendations from the military capability study conducted in December 2011, during the reporting period UNIFIL vacated seven positions to be handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces or to the concerned landowners.

64. On 3 October, Indonesia temporarily withdrew its corvette and helicopter from the Maritime Task Force, bringing the strength of the Maritime Task Force to the level of seven ships (three frigates and four fast patrol boats) and two helicopters. On 16 October, Italy temporarily contributed a frigate with a helicopter to the Maritime Task Force.

V. Observations

65. I welcome the calm that has prevailed along the Blue Line, notwithstanding the incidents described in the present report, tensions elsewhere in Lebanon and the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. I commend the parties for their cooperation with UNIFIL during this difficult period. I urge both parties to continue to work with UNIFIL to maintain the current calm, minimize and halt violations, look for practical localized solutions and build on what has been achieved by strengthening the liaison and coordination arrangements, including through the tripartite mechanism.

66. The lack of progress towards achieving a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to the conflict, as envisaged in resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), remains of concern. I continue to encourage the parties to recommit to the goals of a permanent ceasefire and to work with my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL to that end. I welcome the Security Council's renewed call in this regard in its presidential statement of 10 July ([S/PRST/2013/9](#)).

67. I condemn the incident on 7 August in Labouneh, during which the Israel Defense Forces carried out an incursion across the Blue Line and Hizbullah carried out military operations. The incident represents a serious breach of the cessation of hostilities, which had the potential to escalate. In addition to the Labouneh incident, there were three other violations of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces. This is a troubling development and a matter of concern. Respect for the Blue Line is not only a requirement under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) but also a critical factor in maintaining stability and calm in the area.

68. I also condemn the rocket-launching incident on 22 August. The Lebanese authorities have the primary responsibility to ensure that there are no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River and that the Lebanese territory is not utilized for hostile actions. Notwithstanding the right of Israel to self-defence, retaliatory fire, which occurred early the following morning, does not conform to the expectations of the United Nations with respect to the cessation of hostilities. These expectations include that each side immediately notify UNIFIL if it has been fired upon and that each refrain from responding, except where clearly required in immediate self-defence.

69. Major obligations under the resolution are still outstanding and require action by both parties. I am concerned that there are still unauthorized weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations, in contravention of the resolution. Incidents during the period have demonstrated the continued presence of unauthorized weapons. Lebanon must make further progress towards exercising effective authority over the entire Lebanese territory, preventing the use of its territory for hostile activities, and ensuring the implementation of government decisions and the provisions of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) with respect to an area free of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government and of UNIFIL.

70. I am also concerned that violations of Lebanese airspace continue to be committed almost daily by Israel. I call once again upon the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory and Lebanese territorial waters.

71. The continuing occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces also represents an ongoing violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). Israel has an obligation to withdraw its armed forces from the area, in accordance with the resolution.

72. The visible marking of the Blue Line continues to be an essential confidence-building activity that has helped to calm tensions in some areas. I encourage the parties to continue to work with UNIFIL in the ongoing process to mark the Blue Line in its entirety, including finding practical solutions in the problematic areas.

73. I am concerned about incidents restricting the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and instances of aggressive behaviour towards UNIFIL personnel. Some of these incidents are in violation of resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1773 \(2007\)](#) and have the potential to escalate and compromise UNIFIL operations. The mission's freedom of movement is integral to the effective implementation of its mandate, and the Lebanese authorities are primarily responsible for ensuring that UNIFIL can operate unhindered to this end.

74. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to have a serious impact on Lebanon — in direct cross-border violence, in broader threats to stability and security, in the deeper political polarization in the country and in terms of the fiscal cost and economic and social pressures. I remain concerned at the shelling, shooting and aerial incursions into Lebanese border areas from the Syrian Arab Republic and condemn the continued violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. I call upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties fighting there to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon in accordance with Security Council resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#), [1680 \(2006\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#).

75. The continued involvement of Lebanese citizens in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic is of deep concern, including Hizbullah's acknowledged and high-profile role in the fighting there. Such participation in the Syrian conflict has serious political and security implications. I reiterate my call for all Lebanese parties to step back from involvement in the Syrian conflict, consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration, and urge them once again to recommit to the policy of disassociation.

76. The Security Council and I condemned in the strongest possible terms the acts of indiscriminate violence that targeted civilians in the southern suburbs of Beirut and Tripoli during the reporting period. These terrorist acts in different parts of the country underscore the need for all parties to come together for the unity and stability of Lebanon. They also reflect the worrying proliferation of weapons outside the authority of the State, and in this regard I call upon Member States to uphold their obligation under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) to prevent the sale or supply of arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon. The security authorities have shown commendable determination in pursuing those responsible for these acts of terrorism and other acts of violence. However, continued broad political support is clearly needed if the security and judicial authorities are to combat impunity in respect of all acts of violence, including making progress in the investigation into

the assassination of Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan just over one year ago and other assassination attempts against political figures in 2012.

77. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the State continues to pose a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and stability and contradicts the country's obligations under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). President Sleiman has reiterated the urgency of adopting a national defence strategy in the light of the use of Hizbullah's arms outside Lebanon. I urge the parties to resume the National Dialogue to address the issue of Hizbullah's arms and to try and break the political deadlock in the country. I also reiterate my call for the implementation of earlier decisions of the National Dialogue, specifically those relating to the disarmament of the non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

78. The formation of an empowered Government is increasingly urgent, given the multiple security, humanitarian and development challenges that Lebanon now faces. It has now been seven months since the Government of Prime Minister Mikati resigned. I urge all parties to act in the interests of the Lebanese people and engage with Prime Minister-designate Salam to form a new Government capable of effectively meeting such challenges. In conformity with the legal and constitutional framework and consistent with the country's long-standing democratic tradition, it remains imperative that political parties resume efforts to agree on arrangements for parliamentary elections. Success in forming a Government and progress in preparing for parliamentary elections in the coming period are even more important now, given that presidential elections are also due in May 2014.

79. The international community has reason to be grateful for the continued open border policy of Lebanon and its generous efforts in hosting and assisting Syrian refugees. The burden of such a huge number of refugees on so small and fragile a country is significant. There is an outstanding need for the Lebanese authorities to establish more fully empowered institutional structures to carry out the necessary planning, delivery and coordination of efforts to address the challenge in Lebanon. It is important that members of the international community have begun to take steps in recognition of the need to share the burden, as evidenced, inter alia, in the high-level ministerial meeting held under the auspices of UNHCR in Geneva on 30 September. I commend the steps already taken to share the burden and encourage others to follow suit. I am grateful to all of the donors that have contributed to the appeals for Syrian refugees in Lebanon to date and note the continuing shortfall in the fifth regional response plan. I note that the sixth regional response plan will be launched in December. I again underscore the need for assistance on an unprecedented scale to meet the needs of the refugees and host communities and to assist the Lebanese authorities.

80. The impact that the Syrian crisis in general, and the presence of the Syrian refugees in particular, has had on State services, finances and the economy has become ever more apparent. The World Bank, the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon worked on an assessment that quantified that impact and finalized the document in advance of the meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon, which I convened in New York. Subsequent to that meeting, a stabilization road map for assistance was presented by the Government. I stress the importance of taking this agenda forward and the immediate need to ensure that

early assistance in support of essential government programmes affected by the crisis is available.

81. I commend the Lebanese Armed Forces for their continued commitment and strong cooperation with UNIFIL despite their multiple security responsibilities across Lebanon, in particular during periods of heightened tensions. I am grateful to those countries that continue to provide critical assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces and encourage the international community to further demonstrate its commitment to building the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces, including the Navy.

82. During the reporting period and since the start of the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese Armed Forces has played a crucial role in preventing violence and maintaining stability along the borders of Lebanon and within the country. These multiple roles continue to highlight the strain on the resources and capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, notwithstanding government support and the generous support already provided by some donors. My Special Coordinator and UNIFIL have worked with the Lebanese Armed Forces on coordination mechanisms to facilitate additional donor support in response to the five-year capability development programme finalized earlier in the year and the separate strategic dialogue plan specific to the needs of the UNIFIL area of operations. I again encourage members of the international community that are in a position to do so to promote support through these mechanisms.

83. I welcome the continued efforts of the Palestinian leadership in Lebanon in working with the Lebanese authorities to maintain order. The need to improve the living conditions of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to the resolution of the refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement, is ever more urgent as the Palestine refugee camps are becoming increasingly overcrowded as a result of the numbers of Palestine refugees displaced from the Syrian Arab Republic. I encourage donors to be forthcoming in their support for UNRWA, including to enable it to effectively assist the Palestine refugees displaced from the Syrian Arab Republic.

84. Regrettably, no progress has been made with regard to the Shab'a Farms area in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I call once again upon the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area that I provided in October 2007 (see [S/2007/641](#)).

85. The delimitation of their respective maritime exclusive economic zones in a manner which allows Lebanon and Israel to explore and exploit their natural resources without giving rise to tensions is self-evidently important for the economic well-being of both countries. The United Nations remains ready to assist in this matter should both parties so request.

86. In September, I convened a high-level meeting to help Lebanon withstand the pressures that it currently faces. While Lebanon has been resilient thus far, the pressures continue to increase day by day. Its stability and security are important, not only for the people of Lebanon but also for sustaining the arrangements put in place by resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and calm across the Blue Line, which have in turn made a key contribution to regional peace and security over the past seven years. At a time when renewed efforts are at last being made to address the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and to revive peace talks in the region, it is vital that we continue to make every effort to sustain the stability and security of Lebanon and to

build upon the cessation of hostilities by working to achieve a permanent ceasefire. Longer-term security and stability call for an end to conflict in the region, including progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

87. I am grateful to all Member States contributing military personnel to UNIFIL and the Observer Group Lebanon. I also wish to commend the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and the civilian and military peacekeeping personnel, as well as my Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the staff of his Office, all of whom continue to play a vital role in helping to promote stability along the Blue Line and in Lebanon.
